Friday, April 26, 2013
Tuesday, April 23, 2013
The 11 Most Mystifying Things the Tsarnaev Brothers Did
On Monday, it became official: Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was charged with “use of a weapon of mass destruction” and “malicious destruction of property resulting in death” for his alleged role in last Monday’s bombing of the Boston marathon. The federal criminal complaint comes three days after police captured Tsarnaev in a boat in Watertown, Massachusetts, and four days after a manhunt for these specific suspects began in earnest. For the time being, law enforcement officials believe Dzhokhar and his older brother, Tamerlan, who was killed Friday, acted alone.
More MoJo coverage of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings
- How the FBI in Boston May Have Pursued the Wrong “Terrorist”
- READ: Here Are the Federal Charges Against Boston Bombing Suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
- The 11 Most Mystifying Things the Tsarnaev Brothers Did
- What These Tweets Tell Us About Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
- Stunned Reactions From Former Classmates of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
- Did Boston Bombing Suspect Post Al Qaeda Prophecy on YouTube?
- Boston Marathon Bombing Suspect Charged With Using WMD
Dzhokhar and Tamerlan’s motive—or motives—is still unclear. But that’s not the only unknown. Many of the Tsarnaevs’ actions last week seem baffling in retrospect. Here are some of the most confounding things they did:
- Wear a backwards hat and no sunglasses. Unlike his older brother, Dzhokhar made little effort to prevent cameras from capturing his face, making him easier to identify when the FBI released security camera photos on Thursday. Indeed, classmates at University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth did see him in the photos, but dismissed the similarity because it seemed so far-fetched.
- Not react to the explosions. For three days, investigators pored over all available photos and surveillance videos of the blast area searching for abnormal reactions. The complaint filed in federal court on Monday specifically cites Dzhokhar’s reaction to the first explosion as a giveaway; per the complaint, he glanced in the direction of the first blast only briefly.
- Leave the car in the shop. The Wall Street Journal reported that Dzhokhar stopped by an auto-body shop in Watertown on Tuesday to pick up the Mercedes he’d brought in for repairs.
- Stay in Boston. The second bomb exploded at 2:49 p.m. last Monday. Dzhokhar and Tamerlan carjacked a Mercedes at 10:39 p.m.* on Thursday. What did they do in the interim three days? Go to the gym, check in on their busted car, and, in Dzhokhar’s case, go to a party on the UMass–Dartmouth campus. During the three-day window in which their involvement was unknown, they made no attempt to flee.
- Kill an MIT police officer. Why did the brothers shoot 26-year-old Sean Collier? The murder at 10:30 p.m. on Thursday set in motion the events that would ultimately lead to their capture.
- Run out of cash. When Dzhokhar carjacked a Mercedes on Thursday night, he and his brother had one thing in mind: Get cash, and fast. They emptied $ 800 from an ATM using their victim’s PIN number, before they reached the account limit. Holding up a stranger for money suggests a woeful lack of planning on their part (they hadn’t budgeted) that helped alert them to the authorities.
- Not understand how ATMs work. After reaching the daily withdrawal limit at one ATM, the Tsarnaevs, apparently not realizing that the machines are part of an interconnected system, decided to try their luck at two different machines. The quest to find a working ATM was how they ended up, coincidentally, at a 7/11 in Cambridge around the same time it was the scene of an armed robbery, and were spotted on the store security camera.
- Confess to the hostage. According to the complaint, when Dzhokhar got into the Mercedes, he immediately told the driver, “Did you hear about the Boston explosion? I did that.” That meant their cover would be immediately blown if the driver escaped. Which brings us to…
- Stop for snacks. The Los Angeles Times reported that the hostage escaped after the brothers stopped at a gas station on Memorial Drive to buy snacks.
- Keep the hostage’s phone. The Tsarnaevs continued on without their hostage—but they did have his phone, which allowed police to track their location via GPS.
- Bring a BB gun. The weapons used by the two suspects, according to police: a pressure-cooker bomb, seven IEDs, an M4 carbine, two handguns, and a BB gun. Why a BB gun?
*Correction: This piece initially confused the timing of the bombing and carjackings.
The 11 Most Mystifying Things the Tsarnaev Brothers Did
The 11 Most Mystifying Things the Tsarnaev Brothers Did
On Monday, it became official: Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was charged with “use of a weapon of mass destruction” and “malicious destruction of property resulting in death” for his alleged role in last Monday’s bombing of the Boston marathon. The federal criminal complaint comes three days after police captured Tsarnaev in a boat in Watertown, Massachusetts, and four days after a manhunt for these specific suspects began in earnest. For the time being, law enforcement officials believe Dzhokhar and his older brother, Tamerlan, who was killed Friday, acted alone.
More MoJo coverage of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings
- READ: Here Are the Federal Charges Against Boston Bombing Suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
- The 11 Most Mystifying Things the Tsarnaev Brothers Did
- What These Tweets Tell Us About Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
- Stunned Reactions From Former Classmates of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
- Did Boston Bombing Suspect Post Al Qaeda Prophecy on YouTube?
- Boston Marathon Bombing Suspect Charged With Using WMD
Dzhokhar and Tamerlan’s motive—or motives—is still unclear. But that’s not the only unknown. Many of the Tsarnaevs’ actions last week seem baffling in retrospect. Here are some of the most confounding things they did:
- Wear a backwards hat and no sunglasses. Unlike his older brother, Dzhokhar made little effort to prevent cameras from capturing his face, making him easier to identify when the FBI released security camera photos on Thursday. Indeed, classmates at University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth did see him in the photos, but dismissed the similarity because it seemed so far-fetched.
- Not react to the explosions. For three days, investigators pored over all available photos and surveillance videos of the blast area searching for abnormal reactions. The complaint filed in federal court on Monday specifically cites Dzhokhar’s reaction to the first explosion as a giveaway; per the complaint, he glanced in the direction of the first blast only briefly.
- Leave the car in the shop. The Wall Street Journal reported that Dzhokhar stopped by an auto-body shop in Watertown on Tuesday to pick up the Mercedes he’d brought in for repairs.
- Stay in Boston. The second bomb exploded at 2:49 p.m. last Monday. Dzhokhar and Tamerlan carjacked a Mercedes at 10:39 p.m.* on Thursday. What did they do in the interim three days? Go to the gym, check in on their busted car, and, in Dzhokhar’s case, go to a party on the UMass–Dartmouth campus. During the three-day window in which their involvement was unknown, they made no attempt to flee.
- Kill an MIT police officer. Why did the brothers shoot 26-year-old Sean Collier? The murder at 10:30 p.m. on Thursday set in motion the events that would ultimately lead to their capture.
- Run out of cash. When Dzhokhar carjacked a Mercedes on Thursday night, he and his brother had one thing in mind: Get cash, and fast. They emptied $ 800 from an ATM using their victim’s PIN number, before they reached the account limit. Holding up a stranger for money suggests a woeful lack of planning on their part (they hadn’t budgeted) that helped alert them to the authorities.
- Not understand how ATMs work. After reaching the daily withdrawal limit at one ATM, the Tsarnaevs, apparently not realizing that the machines are part of an interconnected system, decided to try their luck at two different machines. The quest to find a working ATM was how they ended up, coincidentally, at a 7/11 in Cambridge around the same time it was the scene of an armed robbery, and were spotted on the store security camera.
- Confess to the hostage. According to the complaint, when Dzhokhar got into the Mercedes, he immediately told the driver, “Did you hear about the Boston explosion? I did that.” That meant their cover would be immediately blown if the driver escaped. Which brings us to…
- Stop for snacks. The Los Angeles Times reported that the hostage escaped after the brothers stopped at a gas station on Memorial Drive to buy snacks.
- Keep the hostage’s phone. The Tsarnaevs continued on without their hostage—but they did have his phone, which allowed police to track their location via GPS.
- Bring a BB gun. The weapons used by the two suspects, according to police: a pressure-cooker bomb, seven IEDs, an M4 carbine, two handguns, and a BB gun. Why a BB gun?
*Correction: This piece initially confused the timing of the bombing and carjackings.
The 11 Most Mystifying Things the Tsarnaev Brothers Did
Monday, April 8, 2013
Supporters Say All The Wrong Things to Try and Pass CISPA
Ever since reintroducing CISPA, the so-called “cybersecurity bill,” its supporters promote the bill with craftily worded or just plain misleading claims.
By Mark M. Jaycox
EFF
April 9, 2013
Such claims have been lobbed over and over again in op-eds, at hearings, and in press materials. One “fact sheet” by Rep. Rogers and Ruppersberger titled “Myth v. Fact” is so dubious that we felt we had to comment. To stop this type of misinformation—and to stop CISPA—we urge you to tell your members of Congress to stand up for privacy.
Here are some of the statements supporters of CISPA are pushing and why they’re false:
Supporters of CISPA say, “There are no broad definitions”
Supporters are keen to note that the bill doesn’t have broad definitions. In the “Myth v. Fact” sheet, the authors of CISPA specifically point to the definition of “cyber threat information.” Cyber threat information is information about an online threat that companies can share with each other and with any government agency—including the NSA. In hearings, experts have said that they don’t need to share personally identifiable information to combat threats. But the definition in the bill allows for any information related to a perceived threat or vulnerability—including sensitive personal information—to be shared. Cyber threat information should be a narrowly defined term.
Another example of a broad (or missing) definition is the term “cybersecurity system.” Companies can use a “cybersecurity system” to “identify or obtain” information about a potential threat (“cyber threat information”). The definition is critical to understanding the bill, but is circular. CISPA defines a “cybersecurity system” as “a system designed or employed” for a cybersecurity purpose (i.e. to protect against vulnerabilities or threats). The language is not limited to network security software or intrusion detection systems, and is so broadly written that one wonders if a “system” involving a tangible item—e.g., locks on doors—could be considered a “cybersecurity system.” In practical terms, it’s unclear what is exactly covered by such a “system,” because the word “system” is never defined.
The best example of a dangerous undefined term in the bill is found within the overly broad legal immunity for companies. The clause grants a company who acts in “good faith” immunity for “any decisions made” based off of the information it learns from the government or other companies. Does this cover decisions to violate other laws, like computer crime laws? Or privacy laws intended to protect users? Companies should not be given carte blanche immunity to violate long-standing computer crime and privacy law. And it is notoriously hard to prove that a company acted in bad faith, in the few circumstances where you would actually find out your privacy had been violated.
Supporters of CISPA say, “The bill is not a government surveillance program”
Supporters are adamant CISPA doesn’t create a wide-ranging “government surveillance program.” It’s true the bill doesn’t create such a surveillance program like the one described in the ongoing warrantless wiretapping lawsuits.
But the trick here is what is meant by “government surveillance.” We think that if the bill aims at having our information flow to the government, it’s tantamount to government surveillance, whether or not the government initially collected the information.
The bill creates a loophole in the privacy laws that prevented companies from disclosing your information to the government and gives companies broad legal immunity for sharing information with the government. As a result, CISPA makes it more likely that companies will surveil their own users and then disclose that information. The sly wording dodges the key issue: that CISPA encourages companies to conduct surveillance on their networks and hand “cyber threat information” to the government. In short, the bill encourages a de facto private spying regime, with the same end result.
Supporters of CISPA say, “The government can’t read your private email”
Reps. Rogers and Ruppersberger are adamant CISPA doesn’t grant the government access to read private emails. The claim was recently repeated by James Lewis, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. But the broad definitions do allow for personal information to be gathered by companies and then sent to the government without any mandatory minimization of personal information. And under the vague definitions an aggressive company could claim that private messages are related to the threat, obtain them, and share then with the government. If Reps. Rogers and Ruppersberger did want content of emails disclosed under CISPA, it would be easy enough to exclude them explicitly.
Supporters say, “CISPA follows advice from privacy and civil liberty advocates”
In his introduction of the bill, Rep. Rogers assured the audience that he has listened to the privacy and civil liberties community.
This year’s CISPA does contain some language added after privacy and civil liberties advocates complained in 2012. But those changes didn’t address some big issues that were raised last year, and this year’s privacy and civil liberties complaints about CISPA remain unaddressed.
Let’s Stop CISPA
Reps. Rogers and Ruppersberger are on a strong publicity offensive to make sure the bill passes. The American public deserves full explanations and clear meanings about what CISPA can do and the extent to which it can do it. The public doesn’t need carefully worded messaging materials that obfuscate and mislead a discussion on CISPA. The issues at stake—like the broad legal immunity and new spying powers that allow for companies to collect private, and sensitive, user information—are too serious.
Intellihub.com
Supporters Say All The Wrong Things to Try and Pass CISPA
Supporters Say All The Wrong Things to Try and Pass CISPA
Ever since reintroducing CISPA, the so-called “cybersecurity bill,” its supporters promote the bill with craftily worded or just plain misleading claims.
By Mark M. Jaycox
EFF
April 9, 2013
Such claims have been lobbed over and over again in op-eds, at hearings, and in press materials. One “fact sheet” by Rep. Rogers and Ruppersberger titled “Myth v. Fact” is so dubious that we felt we had to comment. To stop this type of misinformation—and to stop CISPA—we urge you to tell your members of Congress to stand up for privacy.
Here are some of the statements supporters of CISPA are pushing and why they’re false:
Supporters of CISPA say, “There are no broad definitions”
Supporters are keen to note that the bill doesn’t have broad definitions. In the “Myth v. Fact” sheet, the authors of CISPA specifically point to the definition of “cyber threat information.” Cyber threat information is information about an online threat that companies can share with each other and with any government agency—including the NSA. In hearings, experts have said that they don’t need to share personally identifiable information to combat threats. But the definition in the bill allows for any information related to a perceived threat or vulnerability—including sensitive personal information—to be shared. Cyber threat information should be a narrowly defined term.
Another example of a broad (or missing) definition is the term “cybersecurity system.” Companies can use a “cybersecurity system” to “identify or obtain” information about a potential threat (“cyber threat information”). The definition is critical to understanding the bill, but is circular. CISPA defines a “cybersecurity system” as “a system designed or employed” for a cybersecurity purpose (i.e. to protect against vulnerabilities or threats). The language is not limited to network security software or intrusion detection systems, and is so broadly written that one wonders if a “system” involving a tangible item—e.g., locks on doors—could be considered a “cybersecurity system.” In practical terms, it’s unclear what is exactly covered by such a “system,” because the word “system” is never defined.
The best example of a dangerous undefined term in the bill is found within the overly broad legal immunity for companies. The clause grants a company who acts in “good faith” immunity for “any decisions made” based off of the information it learns from the government or other companies. Does this cover decisions to violate other laws, like computer crime laws? Or privacy laws intended to protect users? Companies should not be given carte blanche immunity to violate long-standing computer crime and privacy law. And it is notoriously hard to prove that a company acted in bad faith, in the few circumstances where you would actually find out your privacy had been violated.
Supporters of CISPA say, “The bill is not a government surveillance program”
Supporters are adamant CISPA doesn’t create a wide-ranging “government surveillance program.” It’s true the bill doesn’t create such a surveillance program like the one described in the ongoing warrantless wiretapping lawsuits.
But the trick here is what is meant by “government surveillance.” We think that if the bill aims at having our information flow to the government, it’s tantamount to government surveillance, whether or not the government initially collected the information.
The bill creates a loophole in the privacy laws that prevented companies from disclosing your information to the government and gives companies broad legal immunity for sharing information with the government. As a result, CISPA makes it more likely that companies will surveil their own users and then disclose that information. The sly wording dodges the key issue: that CISPA encourages companies to conduct surveillance on their networks and hand “cyber threat information” to the government. In short, the bill encourages a de facto private spying regime, with the same end result.
Supporters of CISPA say, “The government can’t read your private email”
Reps. Rogers and Ruppersberger are adamant CISPA doesn’t grant the government access to read private emails. The claim was recently repeated by James Lewis, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. But the broad definitions do allow for personal information to be gathered by companies and then sent to the government without any mandatory minimization of personal information. And under the vague definitions an aggressive company could claim that private messages are related to the threat, obtain them, and share then with the government. If Reps. Rogers and Ruppersberger did want content of emails disclosed under CISPA, it would be easy enough to exclude them explicitly.
Supporters say, “CISPA follows advice from privacy and civil liberty advocates”
In his introduction of the bill, Rep. Rogers assured the audience that he has listened to the privacy and civil liberties community.
This year’s CISPA does contain some language added after privacy and civil liberties advocates complained in 2012. But those changes didn’t address some big issues that were raised last year, and this year’s privacy and civil liberties complaints about CISPA remain unaddressed.
Let’s Stop CISPA
Reps. Rogers and Ruppersberger are on a strong publicity offensive to make sure the bill passes. The American public deserves full explanations and clear meanings about what CISPA can do and the extent to which it can do it. The public doesn’t need carefully worded messaging materials that obfuscate and mislead a discussion on CISPA. The issues at stake—like the broad legal immunity and new spying powers that allow for companies to collect private, and sensitive, user information—are too serious.
Intellihub.com
Supporters Say All The Wrong Things to Try and Pass CISPA
Thursday, March 21, 2013
Denial is Everywhere (About Increasingly Important Things!)
Denial is Everywhere
Not only is denial everywhere, the denials are about increasingly important things. I offer three recent examples:
- A former Japanese central bank official says “The Positive Impact of the Declining Yen Has Yet to be Seen”
- Regarding Cyprus, all the eurozone nannycrats say “Not Me!” as Capital Controls Placed with Banks Closed Until Tuesday. Click on the link to see the Best that can happen now.
- The French newspaper Le Monde has a “Idea Headline” that states “No, France is Not Bankrupt”.
In regards to France not being bankrupt, I beg to differ. In actuality, the entire global financial system is bankrupt.
Mike “Mish” Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
Mish’s Global Economic Trend Analysis
Denial is Everywhere (About Increasingly Important Things!)
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Monday, March 18, 2013
Wednesday, February 20, 2013
Nestlé Recall and Mafia Connections: 5 Things You Should Know As Horse Meat Scandal Grows
By now you’ve likely heard about the horse meat scandal that is rocking Europe. As far as food scandals go, this one is intriguing. Of course, this is not the first time we’ve learned that the meat we buy may not be everything we thought it was. Remember “pink slime”? The only good news here is that, so far, it doesn’t seem to be an imminent health threat, although it does raise some very alarming questions.
As food politics expert Marion Nestle wrote, “The unfolding drama around Europe’s horsemeat scandal is a case study in food politics and the politics of cultural identity. Cultural identity? They (other people) eat horsemeat. We don’t.”
As Nestle explains, “Most Americans say they won’t eat horsemeat, are appalled by the very idea, and oppose raising horses for food, selling their meat, and slaughtering horses for any reason.” Horse meat, however, is eaten in numerous countries around the world like China, Japan and Indonesia, as well as countries in Europe, including France and Switzerland.
It’s one thing to knowingly eat horse meat; it’s quite another to have it slipped into your food. This opens a pandora’s box of questions about the food we"re buying. For starters: What else is in there (donkey and pig, and the list may grow)? What does it reveal about food safety and our complex food chain? Who is responsible for duping consumers, and how did they get away with it?
It turns out there is a lot we can learn from Europe’s surplus of horse burgers.
1. The Mighty Fall
The most recent news surfacing today is that Nestlé, one of the largest food companies in the world, has now been entangled in the scandal. The New York Timesreports that Nestlé is pulling two products sold in Italy and Spain: Buitoni Beef Ravioli and Beef Tortellini, as well as Lasagnes à la Bolognaise Gourmandes sold to catering companies in France.
Nestlé is just the latest in the list of Europe’s top food companies involved. The story first broke in the UK and Ireland when major supermarket chains Tesco and Aldi were found to be selling beef products that contained horse meat. It spun from there. AdAge reports, “Burger King binned thousands of Whoppers and Angus Burgers, which were sourced from the same Irish beef supplier, Silvercrest, and Findus ‘beef’ lasagna was found to contain 100% horse meat.”
Silvercrest has been fingered, as well as Liffey Meats in Ireland and Dalepak in Yorkshire, accordingto Felicity Lawrence of the Guardian:
Silvercrest and Dalepak are both subsidiaries of ABP Food Group, one of the largest beef processors in Europe.”
… Huge blocks of frozen meat at a cold store in Northern Ireland, Freeza Foods, which had been quarantined by officials suspicious of its labelling and state of packaging, were found to contain 80% horse.
Other top food companies were implicated when the scandal hit France (more on that soon), but the presence of large food companies at the heart of the issue is troubling. While bigger companies are often able to offer products cheaper than small and local stores, some may be questioning if the savings are really worth it if consumers are getting duped. A look at the complex supply chain raises even more fears.
Lawrence writes:
Supermarket buyers and big brands have been driving down prices, seeking special offers on meat products as consumers cut back on their spending in the face of recession. The squeeze on prices has come at a time when manufacturers" costs have been soaring. Beef prices have been at record highs as has the price of grain needed to feed cattle. The cost of energy, heavily used in industrial processing and to fuel centralised distribution chains, has also soared. There has been a mistmatch between the cost of real beef and what companies are prepared to pay.
So, are we really shocked?
2. A Tangled Web
Horse meat has ended up in so-called beef products to varying degrees — some have been found to contain traces of horse DNA, which may have been the result of processing plants not properly cleaning equipment. And some products have been found to contain upward of 80 to 100 percent horse meat, which signals a much larger problem.
Getting to the bottom of how this came about has involved a lot of finger pointing. In Ireland, the ABP Food Group blamed supplies in Netherlands and Spain, and later Poland. “Five weeks into the scandal and the links in the Irish chain have still not been fully established,” writes the Guardian"s Lawrence.” But this gets even more interesting in France, as she explains:
Comigel had subcontracted its ready meal production to a factory in Luxembourg, Tavola. It was supplied with meat by a company called Spanghero. Spanghero had bought meat from a Dutch fraudster already convicted of passing horse off as beef, Jan Fasen.
The Dutch trader ran a company called Draap, which spelled backwards is paard or Dutch for horse. It was registered in Cyprus in 2008, with an offshore vehicle in the British Virgin Islands. It emerged during Fasen"s trial in Holland that he had supplied French companies with horsemeat imported from South America and Mexico fraudulently labelled as Dutch and German “beef” going back to 2007.
The horsemeat found in the recent tests on ready meals exported from France was said to have been sourced by Draap from Romania. The Romanian government has said its meat was legally exported correctly labeled as horse. The French government said Spanghero was the first agent to stamp the horse as beef; Spanghero has denied doing so deliberately. Fasen says Spanghero and French manufacturers were in on the deception from the beginning.
It turns out there may be a whole lot more criminal to this case.
3. Trouble in Romania
It just so happens that Romania may have an excess of dead horses on its hands. John Lichfield of the Independent reports that a change in traffic rules is to blame:
Horse-drawn carts were a common form of transport for centuries in Romania, but hundreds of thousands of the animals are feared to have been sent to the abattoir after the change in road rules.
The law, which was passed six years ago but only enforced recently, also banned carts drawn by donkeys, leading to speculation among food-industry officials in France that some of the “horse meat” which has turned up on supermarket shelves in Britain, France and Sweden may, in fact, turn out to be donkey meat. “Horses have been banned from Romanian roads and millions of animals have been sent to the slaughterhouse,” said Jose Bove, a veteran campaigner for small farmers who is now vice-president of the European Parliament agriculture committee.
While the explanation of where some of the horse meat could have come from is straightforward, how it got to dinner plates is not. As Lichfield explains, “It came from abattoirs in Romania through a dealer in Cyprus working through another dealer in Holland to a meat plant in the south of France which sold it to a French-owned factory in Luxembourg which made it into frozen meals sold in supermarkets in 16 countries.”
4. Blame the Mafia
From here, the story just gets weirder. Jamie Doward reports for the Observer that organized international gangs are suspected of involvement in the scandal. Doward writes:
Experts within the horse slaughter industry have told the Observer there is evidence that both Polish and Italian mafia gangs are running multimillion-pound scams to substitute horsemeat for beef during food production. There are claims that vets and other officials working within abattoirs and food production plants are intimidated into signing off meat as beef when it is in fact cheaper alternatives such as pork or horse. …
“I"m concerned that this is an international criminal conspiracy here and we"ve really got to get to the bottom of it,” [Britain’s environment secretary Owen Paterson] said.
5. Rethinking Our Food
So, we found out that beef products may contain horse, and also pig, and possibly donkey, as well. What to do with that information? For some people, it means buying less meat or from different sources. Reuters reported that 60 percent of people it surveyed in the UK said they were turning to local butchers for their meat and 25 percent said they would buy different cuts instead of processed meat.
AdAge reported that sales of frozen burgers dropped 40 percent in the beginning of February, while the meat-substitute Quorn saw a spike in sales of 10 percent. Emma Hall writes that, “More than two-thirds of British adults said they would be less likely to buy frozen meat products in the future.”
The biggest effect so far has been a drop in public trust. But after countless food safety scandals over the years, some of them deadly, why do we trust a system that’s needlessly complex?
“The food and retail industries have become highly concentrated and globalized in recent decades,” Lawrence writes for the Guardian:
“A handful of key players dominate the beef processing and supermarket sectors across Europe. They have developed very long supply chains, particularly for their economy lines, which enable them to buy the ingredients for processed foods from wherever they are cheapest at any point, depending on exchange rates and prices on the global commodity markets. Networks of brokers, cold stores operators and subcontracted meat cutting plants have emerged to supply rapidly fluctuating orders ‘just in time.’ Management consultants KPMG estimate there are around 450 points at which the integrity of the chain can break down.”
That’s worth repeating — there are 450 places where something could go wrong before your food gets into your hands.
If there was ever a reason to eat more locally produced food and to know where your food comes from and who grows and processes it, this would be a damn good one because this extends far beyond just meat products, and far beyond Europe.
Tue, 02/19/2013 – 12:20
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Nestlé Recall and Mafia Connections: 5 Things You Should Know As Horse Meat Scandal Grows