LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER FROM A LIGHTNING STRIKE 

“LaSalle Unit 1 and LaSalle Unit 2 have both experienced an automatic reactor scram, in conjunction with a loss of offsite power. This was caused by an apparent lightning strike in the main 345kV/138kV switchyard during a thunderstorm. 138kV line 0112 has been inspected in the field, and heavy damage has been noted on the insulators on two of the three phases on a line lightning arrestor line side. 

“The plant systems have all responded as expected. All five diesel generators started, and have loaded on to their respective buses as designed. All rods went full in on both units during the respective scrams. HPCS [High Pressure Core Spray] system was started on each unit and automatically aligned for injection for initial level control.” 

The MSIVs [Main Steam Isolation Valves] are shut on both units with decay heat being removed via the safety relief valves. Suppression pool cooling is in progress. 

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the State. 

Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email. 

* * * UPDATE FROM DON PUCKETT TO VINCE KLCO AT 2113 EDT ON 4/17/2013 * * * 

“In addition to information [previously provided], LaSalle Unit 2 received a high drywell pressure signal [1.77 psig] due to loss of containment cooling from the loss of power. At the time of this high drywell pressure signal, high pressure core spray pump and 2B residual heat removal [RHR] pump was already in operation, the low pressure core spray system and 2A residual heat removal system was secured and [placed] in pull to lock. When the signal was satisfied the ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling Systems] signal was processed but only the 2C RHR pump would have started. In this case, the 2C RHR pump tripped when the signal was received. There is no evidence of reactor coolant leakage. There was no additional ECCS systems discharging into the RCS [Reactor Coolant System]. As [initially stated], level was controlled using High Pressure Core Spray and level control is now being maintained using the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [RCIC] systems. The 2C RHR pump trip is under investigation. 

“Due to the initial loss of offsite power for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 reported at 1511 [CDT], multiple containment isolation valves isolated and closed as expected. Once initial containment isolations were verified, two Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge valves were opened to vent the Unit 2 containment. Once Unit Two containment pressure reached 1.77 [psig], these two vent valves isolated as expected. 

“Due to the loss of offsite power, the Station Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) and the Standby Gas Treatment Wide Range Gas Monitor (VGWRGM) also lost power. Manual sampling has been implemented and power is restored to the VGWRGM, however the VGWRGM has not been declared operable yet. Normal radiation levels have been reported from the manual sampling. [This is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).]“ 

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois. 

Notified the R3 IRC, NRR EO(Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant). 

* * * UPDATE AT 0057 EDT ON 04/18/13 FROM MIKE LAWRENCE TO S. SANDIN * * * 

“After the Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge system isolated on the Unit 2 containment High Pressure signal, Venting of the Unit 1 primary containment was commenced. At 2005 CDT, Unit 1 primary containment pressure reached the Group 2 primary containment isolation system setpoint (1.77 PSIG) causing the primary containment vent and purge valves being used to vent the Unit 1 containment to isolate. Unit 1 primary containment venting was being performed through the Standby Gas Treatment system which is a filtered system. 

“In addition to the primary containment isolation signal on high drywell pressure, an ECCS initiation on high drywell pressure also occurred. The ECCS signal resulted in an auto start of the 1C RHR system. The 1B RHR system was already running in suppression pool cooling mode. 1A RHR and LPCS had been secured to prevent overloading the common diesel generator for division 1. The common diesel generator supplies both Unit 1 and Unit 2 division 1 ESF busses.” 

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified NRR EO (Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant) and R3IRC (Louden).

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LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER FROM A LIGHTNING STRIKE 

“LaSalle Unit 1 and LaSalle Unit 2 have both experienced an automatic reactor scram, in conjunction with a loss of offsite power. This was caused by an apparent lightning strike in the main 345kV/138kV switchyard during a thunderstorm. 138kV line 0112 has been inspected in the field, and heavy damage has been noted on the insulators on two of the three phases on a line lightning arrestor line side. 

“The plant systems have all responded as expected. All five diesel generators started, and have loaded on to their respective buses as designed. All rods went full in on both units during the respective scrams. HPCS [High Pressure Core Spray] system was started on each unit and automatically aligned for injection for initial level control.” 

The MSIVs [Main Steam Isolation Valves] are shut on both units with decay heat being removed via the safety relief valves. Suppression pool cooling is in progress. 

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the State. 

Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email. 

* * * UPDATE FROM DON PUCKETT TO VINCE KLCO AT 2113 EDT ON 4/17/2013 * * * 

“In addition to information [previously provided], LaSalle Unit 2 received a high drywell pressure signal [1.77 psig] due to loss of containment cooling from the loss of power. At the time of this high drywell pressure signal, high pressure core spray pump and 2B residual heat removal [RHR] pump was already in operation, the low pressure core spray system and 2A residual heat removal system was secured and [placed] in pull to lock. When the signal was satisfied the ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling Systems] signal was processed but only the 2C RHR pump would have started. In this case, the 2C RHR pump tripped when the signal was received. There is no evidence of reactor coolant leakage. There was no additional ECCS systems discharging into the RCS [Reactor Coolant System]. As [initially stated], level was controlled using High Pressure Core Spray and level control is now being maintained using the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [RCIC] systems. The 2C RHR pump trip is under investigation. 

“Due to the initial loss of offsite power for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 reported at 1511 [CDT], multiple containment isolation valves isolated and closed as expected. Once initial containment isolations were verified, two Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge valves were opened to vent the Unit 2 containment. Once Unit Two containment pressure reached 1.77 [psig], these two vent valves isolated as expected. 

“Due to the loss of offsite power, the Station Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) and the Standby Gas Treatment Wide Range Gas Monitor (VGWRGM) also lost power. Manual sampling has been implemented and power is restored to the VGWRGM, however the VGWRGM has not been declared operable yet. Normal radiation levels have been reported from the manual sampling. [This is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).]“ 

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois. 

Notified the R3 IRC, NRR EO(Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant). 

* * * UPDATE AT 0057 EDT ON 04/18/13 FROM MIKE LAWRENCE TO S. SANDIN * * * 

“After the Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge system isolated on the Unit 2 containment High Pressure signal, Venting of the Unit 1 primary containment was commenced. At 2005 CDT, Unit 1 primary containment pressure reached the Group 2 primary containment isolation system setpoint (1.77 PSIG) causing the primary containment vent and purge valves being used to vent the Unit 1 containment to isolate. Unit 1 primary containment venting was being performed through the Standby Gas Treatment system which is a filtered system. 

“In addition to the primary containment isolation signal on high drywell pressure, an ECCS initiation on high drywell pressure also occurred. The ECCS signal resulted in an auto start of the 1C RHR system. The 1B RHR system was already running in suppression pool cooling mode. 1A RHR and LPCS had been secured to prevent overloading the common diesel generator for division 1. The common diesel generator supplies both Unit 1 and Unit 2 division 1 ESF busses.” 

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified NRR EO (Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant) and R3IRC (Louden).

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LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER FROM A LIGHTNING STRIKE 

“LaSalle Unit 1 and LaSalle Unit 2 have both experienced an automatic reactor scram, in conjunction with a loss of offsite power. This was caused by an apparent lightning strike in the main 345kV/138kV switchyard during a thunderstorm. 138kV line 0112 has been inspected in the field, and heavy damage has been noted on the insulators on two of the three phases on a line lightning arrestor line side. 

“The plant systems have all responded as expected. All five diesel generators started, and have loaded on to their respective buses as designed. All rods went full in on both units during the respective scrams. HPCS [High Pressure Core Spray] system was started on each unit and automatically aligned for injection for initial level control.” 

The MSIVs [Main Steam Isolation Valves] are shut on both units with decay heat being removed via the safety relief valves. Suppression pool cooling is in progress. 

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the State. 

Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email. 

* * * UPDATE FROM DON PUCKETT TO VINCE KLCO AT 2113 EDT ON 4/17/2013 * * * 

“In addition to information [previously provided], LaSalle Unit 2 received a high drywell pressure signal [1.77 psig] due to loss of containment cooling from the loss of power. At the time of this high drywell pressure signal, high pressure core spray pump and 2B residual heat removal [RHR] pump was already in operation, the low pressure core spray system and 2A residual heat removal system was secured and [placed] in pull to lock. When the signal was satisfied the ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling Systems] signal was processed but only the 2C RHR pump would have started. In this case, the 2C RHR pump tripped when the signal was received. There is no evidence of reactor coolant leakage. There was no additional ECCS systems discharging into the RCS [Reactor Coolant System]. As [initially stated], level was controlled using High Pressure Core Spray and level control is now being maintained using the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [RCIC] systems. The 2C RHR pump trip is under investigation. 

“Due to the initial loss of offsite power for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 reported at 1511 [CDT], multiple containment isolation valves isolated and closed as expected. Once initial containment isolations were verified, two Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge valves were opened to vent the Unit 2 containment. Once Unit Two containment pressure reached 1.77 [psig], these two vent valves isolated as expected. 

“Due to the loss of offsite power, the Station Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) and the Standby Gas Treatment Wide Range Gas Monitor (VGWRGM) also lost power. Manual sampling has been implemented and power is restored to the VGWRGM, however the VGWRGM has not been declared operable yet. Normal radiation levels have been reported from the manual sampling. [This is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).]“ 

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois. 

Notified the R3 IRC, NRR EO(Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant). 

* * * UPDATE AT 0057 EDT ON 04/18/13 FROM MIKE LAWRENCE TO S. SANDIN * * * 

“After the Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge system isolated on the Unit 2 containment High Pressure signal, Venting of the Unit 1 primary containment was commenced. At 2005 CDT, Unit 1 primary containment pressure reached the Group 2 primary containment isolation system setpoint (1.77 PSIG) causing the primary containment vent and purge valves being used to vent the Unit 1 containment to isolate. Unit 1 primary containment venting was being performed through the Standby Gas Treatment system which is a filtered system. 

“In addition to the primary containment isolation signal on high drywell pressure, an ECCS initiation on high drywell pressure also occurred. The ECCS signal resulted in an auto start of the 1C RHR system. The 1B RHR system was already running in suppression pool cooling mode. 1A RHR and LPCS had been secured to prevent overloading the common diesel generator for division 1. The common diesel generator supplies both Unit 1 and Unit 2 division 1 ESF busses.” 

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified NRR EO (Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant) and R3IRC (Louden).

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LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER FROM A LIGHTNING STRIKE 

“LaSalle Unit 1 and LaSalle Unit 2 have both experienced an automatic reactor scram, in conjunction with a loss of offsite power. This was caused by an apparent lightning strike in the main 345kV/138kV switchyard during a thunderstorm. 138kV line 0112 has been inspected in the field, and heavy damage has been noted on the insulators on two of the three phases on a line lightning arrestor line side. 

“The plant systems have all responded as expected. All five diesel generators started, and have loaded on to their respective buses as designed. All rods went full in on both units during the respective scrams. HPCS [High Pressure Core Spray] system was started on each unit and automatically aligned for injection for initial level control.” 

The MSIVs [Main Steam Isolation Valves] are shut on both units with decay heat being removed via the safety relief valves. Suppression pool cooling is in progress. 

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the State. 

Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email. 

* * * UPDATE FROM DON PUCKETT TO VINCE KLCO AT 2113 EDT ON 4/17/2013 * * * 

“In addition to information [previously provided], LaSalle Unit 2 received a high drywell pressure signal [1.77 psig] due to loss of containment cooling from the loss of power. At the time of this high drywell pressure signal, high pressure core spray pump and 2B residual heat removal [RHR] pump was already in operation, the low pressure core spray system and 2A residual heat removal system was secured and [placed] in pull to lock. When the signal was satisfied the ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling Systems] signal was processed but only the 2C RHR pump would have started. In this case, the 2C RHR pump tripped when the signal was received. There is no evidence of reactor coolant leakage. There was no additional ECCS systems discharging into the RCS [Reactor Coolant System]. As [initially stated], level was controlled using High Pressure Core Spray and level control is now being maintained using the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [RCIC] systems. The 2C RHR pump trip is under investigation. 

“Due to the initial loss of offsite power for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 reported at 1511 [CDT], multiple containment isolation valves isolated and closed as expected. Once initial containment isolations were verified, two Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge valves were opened to vent the Unit 2 containment. Once Unit Two containment pressure reached 1.77 [psig], these two vent valves isolated as expected. 

“Due to the loss of offsite power, the Station Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) and the Standby Gas Treatment Wide Range Gas Monitor (VGWRGM) also lost power. Manual sampling has been implemented and power is restored to the VGWRGM, however the VGWRGM has not been declared operable yet. Normal radiation levels have been reported from the manual sampling. [This is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).]“ 

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois. 

Notified the R3 IRC, NRR EO(Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant). 

* * * UPDATE AT 0057 EDT ON 04/18/13 FROM MIKE LAWRENCE TO S. SANDIN * * * 

“After the Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge system isolated on the Unit 2 containment High Pressure signal, Venting of the Unit 1 primary containment was commenced. At 2005 CDT, Unit 1 primary containment pressure reached the Group 2 primary containment isolation system setpoint (1.77 PSIG) causing the primary containment vent and purge valves being used to vent the Unit 1 containment to isolate. Unit 1 primary containment venting was being performed through the Standby Gas Treatment system which is a filtered system. 

“In addition to the primary containment isolation signal on high drywell pressure, an ECCS initiation on high drywell pressure also occurred. The ECCS signal resulted in an auto start of the 1C RHR system. The 1B RHR system was already running in suppression pool cooling mode. 1A RHR and LPCS had been secured to prevent overloading the common diesel generator for division 1. The common diesel generator supplies both Unit 1 and Unit 2 division 1 ESF busses.” 

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified NRR EO (Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant) and R3IRC (Louden).

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LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER FROM A LIGHTNING STRIKE 

“LaSalle Unit 1 and LaSalle Unit 2 have both experienced an automatic reactor scram, in conjunction with a loss of offsite power. This was caused by an apparent lightning strike in the main 345kV/138kV switchyard during a thunderstorm. 138kV line 0112 has been inspected in the field, and heavy damage has been noted on the insulators on two of the three phases on a line lightning arrestor line side. 

“The plant systems have all responded as expected. All five diesel generators started, and have loaded on to their respective buses as designed. All rods went full in on both units during the respective scrams. HPCS [High Pressure Core Spray] system was started on each unit and automatically aligned for injection for initial level control.” 

The MSIVs [Main Steam Isolation Valves] are shut on both units with decay heat being removed via the safety relief valves. Suppression pool cooling is in progress. 

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified the State. 

Notified DHS, FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, NICC, EPA, and Nuclear SSA via email. 

* * * UPDATE FROM DON PUCKETT TO VINCE KLCO AT 2113 EDT ON 4/17/2013 * * * 

“In addition to information [previously provided], LaSalle Unit 2 received a high drywell pressure signal [1.77 psig] due to loss of containment cooling from the loss of power. At the time of this high drywell pressure signal, high pressure core spray pump and 2B residual heat removal [RHR] pump was already in operation, the low pressure core spray system and 2A residual heat removal system was secured and [placed] in pull to lock. When the signal was satisfied the ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling Systems] signal was processed but only the 2C RHR pump would have started. In this case, the 2C RHR pump tripped when the signal was received. There is no evidence of reactor coolant leakage. There was no additional ECCS systems discharging into the RCS [Reactor Coolant System]. As [initially stated], level was controlled using High Pressure Core Spray and level control is now being maintained using the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [RCIC] systems. The 2C RHR pump trip is under investigation. 

“Due to the initial loss of offsite power for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 reported at 1511 [CDT], multiple containment isolation valves isolated and closed as expected. Once initial containment isolations were verified, two Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge valves were opened to vent the Unit 2 containment. Once Unit Two containment pressure reached 1.77 [psig], these two vent valves isolated as expected. 

“Due to the loss of offsite power, the Station Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) and the Standby Gas Treatment Wide Range Gas Monitor (VGWRGM) also lost power. Manual sampling has been implemented and power is restored to the VGWRGM, however the VGWRGM has not been declared operable yet. Normal radiation levels have been reported from the manual sampling. [This is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).]“ 

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois. 

Notified the R3 IRC, NRR EO(Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant). 

* * * UPDATE AT 0057 EDT ON 04/18/13 FROM MIKE LAWRENCE TO S. SANDIN * * * 

“After the Unit 2 primary containment vent and purge system isolated on the Unit 2 containment High Pressure signal, Venting of the Unit 1 primary containment was commenced. At 2005 CDT, Unit 1 primary containment pressure reached the Group 2 primary containment isolation system setpoint (1.77 PSIG) causing the primary containment vent and purge valves being used to vent the Unit 1 containment to isolate. Unit 1 primary containment venting was being performed through the Standby Gas Treatment system which is a filtered system. 

“In addition to the primary containment isolation signal on high drywell pressure, an ECCS initiation on high drywell pressure also occurred. The ECCS signal resulted in an auto start of the 1C RHR system. The 1B RHR system was already running in suppression pool cooling mode. 1A RHR and LPCS had been secured to prevent overloading the common diesel generator for division 1. The common diesel generator supplies both Unit 1 and Unit 2 division 1 ESF busses.” 

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified NRR EO (Skeen), IRD MOC (Grant) and R3IRC (Louden).

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LaSalle Nuclear Plant: Offsite Power Failed Resulting In Potential Radioactive Release

New Radioactive Leak Found At Fukushima After Rat Causes Second Cooling System Failure

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The Fukushima farce continues: a month after a rat (no really) caused the cooling system at the exploded Japanese nuclear power plant to fail, history repeats itself, leading to the second cooling failure in a month. As the NYT reported, “Workers at the stricken Fukushima nuclear power plant who were installing wire nets Friday to keep rats away from a vital cooling system instead tripped that system, causing it to fail for the second time in weeks. Cooling was restored by late evening on Friday, and there was no imminent danger to the 566 nuclear fuel rods stored in the pool, according to the company. It would have taken at least two weeks for the pool to have risen above the safe level of 149 degrees Fahrenheit, Tepco said.” Of course, TEPCO would certainly tell the truth to all those it lied to for weeks in March 2011, the same TEPCO where a rat is the weakest link in its meltdown avoidance planning.

This time however, TEPCO, credibility and professionalism once again in tatters, was forced to reveal a little more, namely that “radioactive water may have leaked into the ground from a storage tank at Japan’s crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in the latest of a series of troubles at the facility.”

Blame the rats again? And don’t worry, it was just “this much” caesium leaking into the ocean, so who’s really counting. Sadly, it will be years before the irradiated fauna – both fish and humans – has a sense, over the daily lies, of just how vast the damage has been. By then, however, Japan will have enough hyperinflation to keep it sufficiently distracted from the third arm growing on the back.

From Al-Jazeera:

The fresh leak on Sunday comes a day after Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) said up to 120 tonnes of contaminated water may have escaped from another of the seven underground reservoir tanks at the tsunami-damaged plant.

 

TEPCO said radioactivity was detected in water outside a tank in the latest leak but that the contaminated water was unlikely to flow into the sea.

 

“We have determined that a minimal amount of water was feared to have leaked from the tank although there was no decline in the level of water inside the tank,” it said in a statement.

 

The tanks store water used to cool down the reactors after radioactive caesium is removed but other radioactive substances remain.

 

The series of leakages came after one of the systems keeping spent atomic fuel cool at the plant temporarily failed on Friday, the second outage in a matter of weeks, underlining the precarious fix at the plant.

Yes, “minimal” – just as it is a “minimal” amount of price increases in imported energy that face the local population following a 30% devaluation in the currency. Don’t worry – just like Fukushima is contained, so local companies can’t wait to hike wages for everyone to make the 2% inflation targeting “fair” for everyone.

Zero Hedge

New Radioactive Leak Found At Fukushima After Rat Causes Second Cooling System Failure

America’s Most Contaminated: Radioactive Waste Leaks into Northwestern River

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February 23, 2013

Radioactive waste is leaking from six underground tanks at America’s most-contaminated facility in Washington, the state’s government announced on Friday. Just how much toxic stew got into the Columbia River’s underground basin is unclear.

The leak at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation has so far not posed an immediate health risk to the public, Governor Jay Inslee said, because it will take a long time, years perhaps, for the waste to reach the groundwater. But the leakages have not been stopped yet.

The US Department of Energy spokeswoman Lindsey Geisler promised federal officials will to collaborate with Washington State to deal with the emergency.

US Senator Ron Wyden from Oregon, who chairs the Senate’s Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said that “This should represent an unacceptable threat to the Pacific Northwest for everybody. There are problems that have to be solved, and the Department of Energy cannot say what changes are needed, when they will be completed, or what they will cost.”

The troubled Hanford nuclear facility is situated very close to the border of Wyden’s native Oregon State.

The US Department of Energy had earlier said that toxic radioactive liquid level was decreasing in one of the 177 tanks at south-central Washington’s Hanford Nuclear Reservation. The leakage was estimated in between 150 to 300 gallons (560-1,100 liters) a year, posing a real threat to groundwater and rivers in the region, state officials acknowledged.

Monitoring wells near the tank have not detected higher radiation levels, AP reported.

After the news about the leakage made into the headlines Governor Inslee visited Washington, DC, for consultations with federal officials, where he learnt that actually six tanks were leaking.

He called the development of things as “disturbing” and promised to “vigorously pursue” a course of new actions “in the next several weeks.”

 

America’s most contaminated facility

Established in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project, the Hanford Nuclear Reservation facility was constructed very quickly on the bank of Columbia River holds millions of liters of a highly-radioactive stew left from decades of plutonium production for nuclear weapons.

All of the radioactive waste storage tanks at Hanford Nuclear Reservation are long past their intended 20-year lifespan.

Those tanks have a long story of unreliability. The documentary ‘Waste: The Nuclear Nightmare’ by filmmaker Eric Guéret and producer Laure Noualhat, filmed in 2009, maintained that the first leakages were registered in 1960s and by now up to 67 out of 177 tanks with radioactive waste have failed.

An estimated nearly-4,000 tons of liquid radioactive waste have contaminated the environment over the decades as a result.The water from the Columbia River has always been used in technological cycle at the Hanford nuclear facility. The systems’ pumps used river water to cool down reactors and then returned it to the river.In 2002 test of Columbia River fish exposed presence of radioactive Strontium 90 in samples.

In spite of the leakage problem reported as being fixed in 2005, the latest developments exposed that “only a narrow band of measurements’ was evaluated, acknowledged Inslee. This means that falls in the levels of radioactive waste in the tanks is an established fact, but nobody knows exactly how much the levels have been changing over time.

“It’s like if you’re trying to determine if climate change is happening, only looking at the data for today,” he said, calling it a “human error”. In any case, the most important thing at the moment is “to find and address the leakers,” the governor pointed out.

The overall quantity of radioactive waste in the tanks is estimated at 200,000 tons, enough to fill dozens of Olympic swimming pools. The quantity of solid radioactive waste piled there is close to 710,000 cubic meters.

A work for future generations

Governor Jay Inslee insists the Hanford Nuclear Reservation must be cleaned of radioactive waste, which would take decades and cost billions of dollars.

Washington is already allocating for Hanford site $ 2 billion annually, actually a third of the national nuclear clean-up budget. But as the latest emergency expose this money is definitely not enough to ensure radioactive contamination security.

A new report entitled ‘2013 Hanford Lifecycle Scope, Schedule and Cost’ by the US Department of Energy estimates the remaining environmental cleanup at Hanford at $ 114.8 billion, a step up from 2012’s $ 112 billion forecast.

The DOA promises to increase the annual clean-up budget at Hanford to over $ 3 billion.At such a pace the operation will possibly continue till 2070 with post-clean management needed till 2090. And costs usually tend to increase with lengthy projects.

America’s nuclear ordnance workshop

The site, near the town of Hanford in south-central Washington, used to be home to the B Reactor, the world’s first full-scale weapon-grade plutonium production reactor.

Plutonium produced at the facility was used in the first nuclear bomb, tested at the Trinity site, as well as in the Fat Man, the 21-kt bomb detonated over Nagasaki, Japan.

Several reactors commissioned at the Hanford facility produced most of plutonium (57 tons) for the American nuclear arsenal (60,000 warheads and bombs at the peak). Production continued for over 40 years and was stopped in 1987.

The site was constructed in what was considered a poorly-populated mountain area, but today there is a Tri-City metropolitan area (towns Richland, Kennewick and Pasco) just miles downriver from the facility. The population of the metropolitan area exceeded 250,000 as of the 2010 census.

There are also at least six Native American reservations situated close to the site.The new project of the US Energy Department implies constructing a plant that will transfer all of the radioactive liquid at the Hanford facility into glasslike logs for secure storage. But the estimated $ 12.3 billion cost of the factory has surpassed the budget by billions of dollars already and lags behind schedule.

The new program is expected to be operable no earlier than in 2019. Meanwhile the authorities have to utilize a limited budget to build additional tanks to prevent an environmental disaster until the new technology is in place.

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America’s Most Contaminated: Radioactive Waste Leaks into Northwestern River